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THE USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN FOR ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT IN BALTIMORE, MARYLAND: TEN YEARS 
AFTER KELO 
ELVA E. TILLMAN∗ 
“Restricting the definition of ‘public use’ in the context of 
eminent domain could tie the hands of local government 
attempting to redevelop brownfields or economically depressed 
neighborhoods and business districts.  It might very well curtail a 
community’s ability to direct new growth and development to 
areas where urban infrastructure and services already exist, a 
key component of smart growth initiatives.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Baltimore City, Maryland was founded in 1729;2 it was incorporated 
between 1796 and 1797.3  At that time, it was part of Baltimore County.4  
In 1851, it became an independent city.5  The Port of Baltimore, which has 
marked its 300th birthday,6 is generally recognized as the second largest 
seaport in the Mid-Atlantic.7  Since its founding, Baltimore has been known 
for both innovation and urban tension.  Over the past three centuries, the 
city has experienced phases of development and decline, both of which 
have warranted extraordinary measures.  In decline, Baltimore, dubbed the 
“City of Neighborhoods,” has struggled to reinvent itself.  More 
specifically, in the face of population decline, deteriorating infrastructure, 
grime, crime, and civil unrest the center city has searched for tools to 
revitalize itself.  However, the private sector has not prompted the quick 
emergence of economic development without government assistance.  In 
Baltimore City, eminent domain has been used as a tool to remove blight 
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 1.  APA Urges Court to Retain Eminent Domain for Economic Development, AMERICAN 
PLANNING ASS’N (Feb. 17, 2005), https://www.planning.org/news releases/2005/feb17-2.htm 
(discussing the potential impact of Kelo v. New London on urban economic development). 
 2.  SUZANNE ELLERY GREENE, BALTIMORE: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY 4 (1980). 
 3.  Id. at 65. 
 4.  Id. at 66.  
 5.  Id. at 110.   
 6.  PORT OF BALTIMORE, http://portofbaltimore300.org/history/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).   
 7.  Id. 
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and certain racial and socio-economic groups.8  Baltimore has also used 
eminent domain to stimulate economic development. 
While many critics bemoan the use of eminent domain, private 
development has needed stimulation.  In Baltimore, government 
assemblage of land for redevelopment has spurred economic development.  
In 1961, the development of the Charles Center marked Baltimore’s 
rebirth—eminent domain was used to assemble the land for that rebirth.9  A 
decade later, acquisition through eminent domain was used in the Inner 
Harbor project; that project has stimulated worldwide interest.10  More 
recently, the City has used eminent domain along with negotiation in the 
area just east of the Harbor to redevelop the Harbor East community.11  The 
city has also relied on eminent domain in neighborhoods adjacent to 
significant institutions such as Johns Hopkins Hospital in East Baltimore 
and the University of Maryland Professional Schools in West Baltimore.  
Around Johns Hopkins Hospital, the East Baltimore Development Initiative 
(“EBDI”) is spearheading a range of housing development and commercial 
support facilities projects.12  Similarly, West Baltimore has a thriving Bio 
Technology Park consisting of twelve acres on the west side of the 
University of Maryland’s campus.  Once completed, the “BioPark” will 
include 1.8 million square feet of laboratory and office space in twelve 
buildings with garage parking and landscaped parks.13 
Eminent domain, along with negotiation and other acquisition tools, 
has been an effective approach to revitalizing Baltimore City.  The use of 
eminent domain for economic development makes good economic sense.  
Redevelopment through eminent domain has increased the City’s tax base 
and attracted other new, private developments, new residents, and 
employment opportunities.  The Hope VI projects,14 which involved some 
eminent domain acquisitions and the redevelopment of the public housing 
projects such as Pleasant View Gardens (in East Baltimore) and Heritage 
                                                          
 8.  ANTERO PIETILA, NOT IN MY NEIGHBORHOOD: HOW BIGOTRY SHAPED A GREAT 
AMERICAN CITY 50–51, 54–56 (2010). 
 9.  BALTIMORE SAVOIR FAIR: A DISCRIMINATING GUIDE TO THE CITY’S BEST SHOPS, 
BOUTIQUES, RESTAURANTS, UNIQUE SERVICES, AND ATTRACTIONS, INTRODUCTION (1984). 
 10.  Id.  
 11.  See Zografos v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 165 Md. App. 80, 89–90, 884 A.2d 770, 
775 (2005) (discussing the City’s condemnation of property in Fells Point as part of an “Urban 
Renewal Plan”).   
 12.  See generally Phillip A. Hummel, East Side Story: The Redevelopment of East Baltimore, 
15 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 97 (2008).   
 13.  THE BIOPARK, http://www.umbiopark.com/BioPark/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2015). 
 14.  The Revitalization of Severely Distressed Public Housing, or “Hope VI,” grew from a 
National Action Plan to eradicate severely distressed public housing, spearheaded by the National 
Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing.  See Revitalization of Severely Distressed 
Public Housing (HOPE VI), U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV., 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/hudprograms/hopevi (last visited Nov. 17, 2015). 
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Crossing and the Townes at the Terraces (in West Baltimore), have 
revitalized the residential and commercial scene in Baltimore.15  Baltimore 
City is working with private developers, and it has used eminent domain to 
recreate whole neighborhoods. 
Well before this concrete evidence existed, the Maryland appellate 
courts formally recognized that the use of eminent domain made good 
economic sense.  In 1924, the Court of Appeals decided Marchant v. Mayor 
and City Council of Baltimore,16 which involved a petition to condemn land 
for the development of the Baltimore harbor.17  The petition particularly 
described shore lands, together with “all riparian and aquatic rights of the 
[defendants] . . . as the owner . . . of said property.”18  More specifically, the 
land was condemned for the purposes of implementing a comprehensive 
plan for harbor development.19  The Maryland General Assembly had made 
provisions for harbor development.  On appeal, the appellant land owner 
raised a number of procedural issues about how the condemnation was 
done; the Marchant court resolved those issues in favor of the City of 
Baltimore.20 
Later, in 1975, thirty years before Kelo v. City of New London,21 the 
Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of economic 
development takings in Maryland.22  The court specifically held that 
condemning private property for the development of an industrial park 
meets the “public use” requirement for eminent domain.23  This is an 
example of how Maryland courts historically have interpreted the “public 
use” requirement in condemnation cases broadly and have “almost always” 
deferred to the legislature’s decision to use eminent domain.24 
This Essay provides a review of legislative and judicial responses to 
Kelo in the State of Maryland during the past ten years.  More specifically, 
the use of eminent domain in Baltimore City has spurred the evolution of 
such appellate court decisions in the State of Maryland.  This Essay also 
offers some advice to minimize the potential of what critics of eminent 
domain have characterized as the abusive use of eminent domain. 
                                                          
 15.  Jessica Valdez, Troubled West Baltimore Site Gets Fresh Start with Heritage Crossing, 
BALT. SUN (July 16, 2003), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2003-07-
16/news/0307160102_1_murphy-homes-heritage-crossing-grayson. 
 16.  Marchant v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 146 Md. 513, 126 A. 884 (1924). 
 17.  Id. at 516, 126 A. at 885.  
 18.  Id. at 520, 126 A. at 886. 
 19.  Id. at 517, 126 A. at 885. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 22.  Id.  
 23.  Prince Georges County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 275 Md. 171, 190–91, 339 A.2d 
288–89.  The case is discussed infra Part III.A.1.  
 24.  Id.   
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I.  AN OVERVIEW OF KELO 
In Kelo, the Supreme Court upheld the taking of private property for 
economic development.25  The facts of the case reveal that the city of New 
London, Connecticut approved a development plan that authorized the 
construction of a waterfront hotel, restaurants, retail stores, residences, and 
office space; in addition, portions of the development area were to be used 
for marinas and support services.26  As part of the development plan, the 
city authorized acquisition of property through negotiated sales and eminent 
domain.27  Most of the property was acquired through negotiated sales, but 
nine owners refused to sell.28  These homeowners filed suit in the New 
London Superior Court, alleging that the taking of their properties would 
violate the “public use” restriction of the Fifth Amendment.29 
Following the conclusions of the Connecticut Supreme Court, the 
United States Supreme Court found that the development plan served a 
public purpose and therefore constituted a public use under the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.30  The Supreme Court also agreed with the 
conclusion of the Connecticut court that the plan was not adopted to benefit 
a particular class of identifiable individuals.31  Furthermore, although the 
owners’ particular properties were not blighted, the Court gave deference to 
the City’s determination that a program of economic rejuvenation for the 
overall area was justified.32  The Kelo Court held that there was no basis for 
exempting economic development from the broad definition of “public 
purpose.”33  The Court declined to require a reasonable certainty that the 
expected public benefits would accrue and deferred to the City’s 
determination of the boundary of the development area.34  Therefore, the 
Kelo Court affirmed the judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court.35 
A.  The Maryland Response 
As discussed in the Introduction, the Maryland Court of Appeals 
upheld the constitutionality of economic development takings in Collington 
                                                          
 25.  545 U.S. 469, 489–90 (2004). 
 26.  Id. at 472, 474.  
 27.  Id. at 475.  
 28.  Id.  
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. at 489–90.  
 31.  Id. at 478, 485 (declining to follow petitioners’ argument for a bright line rule against 
eminent domain for economic development and stating that “the government’s pursuit of a public 
purpose will often benefit individual private parties”).  
 32.  Id. at 483.  
 33.  Id. at 485.  
 34.  Id. at 488–89.  
 35.  Id. at 490.  
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Crossroads—thirty years before Kelo.36  Of course, that does not mean that 
all Marylanders were supportive of the ruling in Kelo.  Since Collington 
Crossroads, and continuing after Kelo, many interest groups have lobbied 
the Maryland General Assembly to adopt legislation to prohibit the use of 
eminent domain.  Election year efforts seem to be particularly intense 
because elected officials want to appear to be responsive to critics of the use 
of eminent domain in their bids to be re-elected. 
B.  The Task Force on Business-Owner Compensation in 
Condemnation Proceedings 
In July 2004, Maryland’s Governor appointed a Task Force composed 
of private, public, and nonprofit organization representatives with 
experience in eminent domain to review business-owner compensation in 
condemnation proceedings.37  Although the Task Force was created the year 
before the Supreme Court decided Kelo, and thus was not formed 
specifically to address that case, the group did consider Kelo as their work 
progressed.  The group was established to study issues involved in 
compensating business owners in condemnation proceedings, such as 
whether business goodwill is compensable and if so, how courts can 
calculate it in condemnation proceedings.38 Additionally, the Task Force 
studied the feasibility of requiring a displacing public agency to conduct a 
study on the impact of condemnation on businesses in the area where 
condemnation proceedings take place.39 
The Task Force looked at the appropriateness of establishing a fund to 
provide financial assistance to businesses impacted by a condemnation 
proceeding and the feasibility of shortening the condemnation process for 
businesses.40  A preliminary report was submitted to the Governor and 
General Assembly on January 21, 2005, and a final report was submitted on 
December 21, 2005; authorization of the Task Force expired December 31, 
2005.41  The impact of the Task Force is reflected below in a discussion of 
legislative failure and success. 
                                                          
 36.  See supra text accompanying notes 23–26.  
 37.  Task Force on Business-Owner Compensation in Condemnation Proceedings, 
MARYLAND MANUAL ON-LINE: A GUIDE TO MARYLAND & ITS GOVERNMENT, 
http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/26excom/defunct/html/04busin.html (last visited Nov. 
20, 2015). 
 38.  REPORT OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND TASK FORCE ON BUSINESS OWNER 
COMPENSATION IN CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS 44–63 (2005), 
http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/26excom/defunct/html/04busin.html (follow “Report, 
December 21, 2005” hyperlink).  Within the concept of business goodwill, the Task Force focused 
on small business goodwill.  Id. at 1.  
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id.  
 41.  TASK FORCE ON BUSINESS-OWNER COMPENSATION IN CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS, 
supra note 37. 
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II. LEGISLATIVE FAILURE AND SUCCESS 
It is interesting to review how legislative efforts in Maryland compare 
to nationwide trends.  Within four months after the Kelo decision, four 
states (Michigan, New Mexico, North Dakota, and South Dakota) enacted 
eminent domain legislation.42  One state passed a constitutional 
amendment.43  In 2006, the year after the Kelo decision, twenty-one states 
passed reforms to limit the use of eminent domain.  Most used statutory 
provisions, but some undertook constitutional amendments.44  From 2005 to 
2006, reforms fell into the following seven broad categories: 
1. Prohibiting [the use of] eminent domain for economic 
development . . . ; 
2. Limiting eminent domain to a “stated public purpose”; 
3. Restricting eminent domain to blighted properties or [to] where 
an area as a whole is considered blighted; 
4. [Imposing] a moratorium on [the use of] eminent domain . . . 
for economic development for a stated period while legislative 
task forces evaluated the issue; 
5. Increasing the compensation amount for condemned property 
where it is a person’s principal residence; 
6. Imposing greater procedural requirements on eminent domain 
use, for example, greater public notice, more public hearings, 
good-faith negotiations and elected governing body approval; and 
7. Redefining “public use” as possession, occupation or 
enjoyment of the property by the public at large, public agencies 
or public utilities.45 
In Maryland, after Kelo, in an atmosphere of election year 
responsiveness and earnest Task Force efforts, more than forty pieces of 
                                                          
 42.  In Michigan, Senate Joint Resolution E, passed by the legislature on December 13, 2005, 
approved by voters on November 7, 2006; House Bills 5818, 5819 and 5060, all signed into law 
on September 20, 2006; House Bill 5820 and 5821, both signed into law on October 3, 2006; 
Senate Bill 693, signed into law on September 20, 2006; House Bills 6638 and 6639, both signed 
into law on January 8, 2007.  In New Mexico, House Bill 393, signed into law on April 3, 2007, 
House Bill 401, signed into law on April 3, 2007.  In North Dakota, Ballot Measure 2 (sponsored 
by citizen initiative), approved by voters on November 7, 2006; Senate Bill 2214 signed into law 
on April 5, 2007.  In South Dakota, House Bill 1080, signed into law on February 17, 2006.   
 43.  Florida House Bil1 1567 and new constitution amendment, signed into law on May 11, 
2006 has been singled out by Castle Coalition in 2007 as “models for other state legislatures.” 50 
State Report Card: Tracking Eminent Domain Reform Legislation Since Kelo, CASTLE 
COALITION, http://castlecoalition.org/50-state-report-card (last visited Nov. 23, 2015) [hereinafter 
50 State Report Card] 
 44.  See generally id.; John C. Murphy, Eminent Domain, 41 MD. B. J. 3, 29 (Nov./Dec. 
2008); James L. Thompson & Joseph P. Suntum, The Condemnation Landscape Across the 
Country Post-Kelo—A Maryland Perspective, MARYLAND STATE BAR ASS’N, INC., 
http://www.msba.org/sections/realproperty/groundrules/winter2007/eminentdomain.aspx (last 
visited Nov. 23, 2015).  
 45.  Thompson & Suntum, supra note 44.  
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legislation were introduced in the General Assembly.46  Legislation 
included efforts to provide business owners with compensation for the loss 
of goodwill if the business could not be relocated, as well as the loss of 
income during the period the business was interrupted.47  The primary bills, 
Senate Bill 3 and House Bill 1137, were introduced during the 2006 
legislative session.48  The legislation essentially would have required a 
specified government unit to make findings in writing before condemning 
and transferring private property to a private party for economic 
development purposes, established a standard for judicial review of 
government units’ findings, provided that damages awarded for the taking 
of property used for a business or farm operation may include specified 
damages for the loss of “goodwill” under specified circumstance, etc.49  
Local government organizations opposed the bills, and no such legislation 
passed that year.50 
In 2007, pared-down versions of the legislation reappeared with 
broader support.  There seemed to be an agreement that “something” 
needed to be done to make property owners under condemnation “whole” 
and send a message that government should use eminent domain in a 
“responsible” manner.51  The Maryland General Assembly session 
concluded with property owners under eminent domain reaping more 
compensation.  The legislation passed, allowing a higher compensation 
package for property owners, including relocation expenses.  For instance, 
the legislation raised a $10,000 cap to $60,000 on costs to re-establish a 
farm, small business or nonprofit group.52  The legislation also requires 
Maryland state and local governments to initiate eminent domain 
proceedings within a four-year period of obtaining authorization.53 
III.  EMINENT DOMAIN AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT—A SLOWLY 
EVOLVING PRACTICE AREA 
Over the past forty years, the Maryland Court of Appeals has 
sanctioned the use of eminent domain for economic development, while 
still observing constitutional standards.  The following selected cases 
                                                          
 46.  See Bill by Subject: Condemnation—2006 Regular Session, GEN. ASSEMBLY OF MD 
(2006), http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/webmga/frmmain.aspx?tab+subject3&ys+2006rs/subjects/co.  
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  50 State Report Card, supra note 43.  
 51.  See Laura Smitherman, Eminent Domain Bill Passed in Md. Senate, BALT. SUN (Apr. 3, 
2007), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2007-04-03/news/0704030027_1_eminent-domain-
property-owners-bill. 
 52.  2007 MD. LAWS 1940 (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 112-
501, 12-202, 12-204–12-205.1) (West 2012). 
 53.  Id. 
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provide a perspective regarding the Maryland Court of Appeals’ early and 
more recent rulings related to eminent domain and economic 
development.54  The case law can be divided into those before Kelo and 
those after Kelo.  While Maryland courts continue to support the use of 
eminent domain for economic development, there is an emphasis on 
demonstrating necessity when property is taken immediately via quick-take 
condemnation. 
A.  Before Kelo 
Prior to Kelo, the Maryland appellate courts seemed to review their 
opinions regarding Baltimore City to sanction the use of eminent domain 
for economic development. 
1.  Prince George’s County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc. 
When Collington Crossroads reached the Court of Appeals in 1975, 
the court considered “[w]hether the purpose of the condemnation, namely 
the development of a multi-industry ‘employment center,’ or ‘industrial 
park,’ constitutes the requisite ‘public use’ so as to justify the County’s 
exercise of eminent domain.”55 
In 1968, the Maryland General Assembly authorized Prince George’s 
County to issue bonds to finance the acquisition of land for the 
development and the construction of “public airport facilities and industrial 
parks.”56  On August 22, 1968, the County filed a petition for condemnation 
in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County seeking to acquire land to 
construct a “public airport facility.”57  After some time, the County moved 
to amend its petition to allow condemnation of the land solely for the 
purpose of developing an industrial park.58  Around the same time, a 
fifteen-member Industrial Park Task Force, authorized by the County 
government, was assigned to formulate a comprehensive plan of 
development for the industrial park.59  Collington Crossroads’ tract of land 
was included as part of the comprehensive plan.60  The plan outlined a 
comprehensive development strategy and explained the public benefits that 
                                                          
 54.  Stephen Demos, Summer Clerk, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of 
Law, initially developed the following case summaries as part of a research project undertaken 
during his clerkship at the Department of Law (the City Solicitor’s Office) during the summer of 
2015.  The original summaries have been edited and are included here to provide a context for 
discussing Maryland Court of Appeals cases.   
 55.  Prince George’s County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 275 Md. 171, 172, 339 A.2d 278, 
279 (1975). 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. at 175, 339 A.2d at 280.  
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. at 176, 339 A.2d at 281. 
 60.  Id. 
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would result from such development and economic growth.61  Collington 
Crossroads opposed the taking.  On May 23, 1974, the circuit court 
dismissed the County’s amended petition for condemnation, finding that the 
purpose of the condemnation was for private use, not public use.62  The 
court based its ruling on the fact that the commercial land would ultimately 
be owned by private entities.  The County appealed the circuit court’s 
decision to the Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals reversed the Circuit Court for Prince George’s 
County, concluding that all “projects reasonably designed to benefit the 
general public, by significantly enhancing the economic growth of the State 
or its subdivisions, are public uses, at least where the exercise of the power 
of condemnation provides an impetus which private enterprise cannot 
provide.”63  The Court concluded that the constitutional term “public use” is 
not synonymous with physical use or access by the general public.  Just 
because private businesses or persons will also receive benefit from a 
condemnation does not destroy the public character of a project.64 
In reaching this conclusion, first, the court relied on the Task Force’s 
comprehensive plan and findings indicating that the type of industrial park, 
which it considered necessary for the economic well-being of the County, 
would be too costly for private developers.65  Second, the court was 
persuaded by the fact that the County would be maintaining significant 
control over the industrial park after the land would be sold to private 
owners via development covenants and zoning restrictions.66  Relying on 
the precedent of New Central Coal Co. v. George’s Creek Coal & Iron 
Co.,67 Pitznogle v. Western Maryland R. R. Co.,68 and Marchant, the court 
reasoned that the public character of a condemnation is not necessarily 
changed because a private entity will own the property.69 
2.  Free State Realty Co. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore 
The Maryland Court of Appeals considered four issues in Free State 
Realty Co. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore:70 whether the City had 
the authority to acquire the property in question; whether the ordinance of 
the City sets forth proper standards, controls or guidelines for the execution 
                                                          
 61.  Id. at 177–78, 339 A.2d at 281–82. 
 62.  Id. at 179, 339 A.2d at 282. 
 63.  Id. at 191, 339 A.2d at 289.  
 64.  Id. at 187, 339 A.2d at 286–87.  
 65.  Id. at 179–80, 339 A.2d at 283. 
 66.  Id. at 180, 339 A.2d at 283. 
 67.  37 Md. 537 (1873).  
 68.  119 Md. 673, 87 A. 917 (1913).  
 69.  Collington Crossroads, 275 Md. at 187, 339 A.2d at 286–87. 
 70.  279 Md. 550, 369 A.2d 1030 (1977). 
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of the ordinance; or alternatively, whether the administrative agency has 
been given the authority or taken the initiative to issue regulations setting 
forth standards, controls or guidelines for said execution; whether the taking 
was for a public use; and whether the evidence proffered established the 
requisite necessity to exercise a “quick-take” condemnation.71 
Baltimore City filed a petition to condemn and a petition for 
immediate possession and title to take the leasehold interest in the property 
located at 2526 West Franklin Street, in Baltimore, Maryland, (the 
“Property”) “for urban renewal purposes.” 
At trial, the court considered the right to condemn and the right to 
immediate possession as a preliminary matter:72 
[A] building inspector testified that when he visited the subject 
property on September 3, 1974, he observed that ‘[w]indows and 
doors were broken,’ there ‘was rubbish and debris inside,’ ‘the 
house was vacant’ and ‘the grounds were unsanitary.’  Another 
employee of the City’s Department of Housing and Community 
Development said . . . that when he last visited the property on 
July 13, 1975, three days before the hearing on the petition, there 
had been no effort made to rehabilitate the dwelling.  The author 
of the affidavit attached to the petition for immediate possession 
testified that the City sought to acquire the property ‘because it 
was reported as a poor condition, blighted property,’ invoking the 
authority of Ordinance No. 152, § 2(h) approved June 28, 
1968. . . .  A copy of the letter to the Board of Estimates was filed 
as an exhibit in the proceeding.  The letter said that the Housing 
Commissioner ‘ha[d], along with members of [his] staff, 
inspected the properties listed above, and . . . certif[ied] that said 
properties [did] meet the . . . requirements’ of Ordinance No. 152, 
§ 26(h).73 
Consequently, “the trial judge passed an order in which he found ‘that 
it [was] necessary for the [City] to acquire immediate possession and title to 
said property.’”74  Free State Realty Company appealed to the Court of 
Special Appeals, which affirmed the lower court’s decision.75  The Court of 
Appeals granted Free State’s writ of certiorari and affirmed the lower 
court’s holdings for each of the four issues considered.76 
                                                          
 71.  Id. at 551–52, 369 A.2d at 1030–31. 
 72.  Id. at 553, 369 A.2d at 1031. 
 73.  Id. at 553–54, 369 A.2d at 1031–32. 
 74.  Id. at 554, 369 A.2d at 1032 (alterations in original). 
 75.  Id.  
 76.  Id. 
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The court cited the holding in Master Royalties Corp. v. City of 
Baltimore77 as controlling precedent.78  In its opinion the court further 
highlighted the language of the urban renewal ordinance, believing that the 
City Council had affirmatively granted such power that it was 
constitutionally authorized to do pursuant to Maryland Constitution Article 
XI-B, Section 1 and Article III, Section 40A.  The court also cited 
Herzinger v. City of Baltimore79 and Matthaei v. Housing Authority80 as the 
controlling authority.  The court referenced Master Royalties Corp.81 and 
Herzinger82 to support its holding that the use contemplated in this case 
was, in fact, public in nature.83 
The court then relied on Murphy v. State Roads Commission84 and 
Prince George’s Co. v. Beard,85 among other cases, to support its holding 
that the necessity for a particular condemnation is for the condemnor and 
not for the courts to decide, and that the decision of such condemnor is final 
so long as it acts reasonably and in good faith.86  The court further 
explained that the record was devoid of any allegation or implication of 
improper motive or purpose on the part of the City.87 
In reaching its conclusion, the court applied the premise laid out in 
earlier Maryland cases that necessity for a particular condemnation is a 
decision for the condemnor, not the courts.  The court also applied 
Maryland precedent to conclude that the decision of the condemnor is 
final—so long as the condemnor has acted reasonably and in good faith.  In 
the subsequent cases discussed in this Essay, the Court distinguished this 
case from unnecessary quick-take condemnation cases.  Later cases cite the 
“immediate necessity” of  remedying a public health hazard as the 
distinguishing factor in Free State Realty Co. v. Mayor & City Council of 
Baltimore.88 
                                                          
 77.  Master Royalties Corp. v. City of Balt., 235 Md. 74, 200 A.2d 652 (1964). 
 78.  Id. at 80–81, 200 A. 2d at 654–55. 
 79.  203 Md. 49, 62, 98 A.2d 87 (1953). 
 80.  177 Md. 506, 516 (1939). 
 81.  Master Royalties Corp., 235 Md. at 74, 200 A.2d at 652. 
 82.  Herzinger, 203 Md. at 49, 98 A.2d at 87. 
 83.  Free State Realty Co. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 235 Md. 550, 557, 369 A.2d 
1030, 1034 (1977). 
 84.  159 Md. 7, 149 A.2d 566 (1930). 
 85.  266 Md. 83, 291 A.2d 636 (1972). 
 86.  Free State Realty Co., 235 Md. at 558–60, 369 A.2d at 1034–35. 
 87.  Id. at 560, 369 A.2d at 1035.  
 88.  See, e.g., Mayor & City Council of Balt. City v. Valsamaki, 397 Md. 222, 247–49, 916 
A.2d 324, 341 (2007). 
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B.  After Kelo 
Following Kelo, the Maryland Court of Appeals has continued to 
support the use of eminent domain for economic development.  However, 
the Court has placed a clear restraint on the use of quick-take condemnation 
without “immediate necessity.”89 
1.  Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City v. Valsamaki 
In Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City v. Valsamaki,90 the City of 
Baltimore (the “City”) appealed from a Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
judgment.  The City asked the court to answer the question, “Under the 
Code of Public Local Laws of Baltimore City, Maryland, §21-16(a), does 
the City have the burden to prove ‘necessity’ to proceed with a quick take 
condemnation for purposes of economic development?” 91 
The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore adopted Ordinance No. 82-
799 on October 25, 1982, which established the Charles North Urban 
Renewal Plan for the Charles North Revitalization Area.92  The main goal 
of the Urban Renewal Plan was to revitalize the Charles North area through 
redevelopment in an effort “to create a unique mixed-use neighborhood” 
that would enhance the viability of the area and promote the expansion of 
business.93  Mr. Valsamaki’s Bar & Lounge (the “Property”) was located 
within the boundaries of the Charles North Revitalization Area as set out by 
the City Ordinance.94  The issue before the court arose on March 9, 2006, 
when the City acted on Ordinance No. 04-695 and filed a petition for 
condemnation and a petition for immediate possession of and title to the 
Property in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.95  The City also attached 
an affidavit from the Director of Property Acquisition and Relocation, 
Department of Housing and Community Development, that stated, “The 
property known as 1924 N. Charles Street . . . must be in possession of the 
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore at the earliest possible time in order 
to assist in a business expansion in the area.”96 
                                                          
 89.  Under “quick-take” condemnation, the municipality takes immediate possession of the 
owner’s property with estimated just compensation placed in an escrow account until actual 
compensation has been ascertained.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 310 (8th ed. 2004) (referring 
to a “quick-take” condemnation as a “quick condemnation,” which is “the immediate taking of 
possession of private property for public use, whereby the estimated compensation is deposited in 
court or paid to the condemnee until the actual amount of compensation can be established”); see 
also Valsamaki, 397 Md. 222, 916 A.2d 324.   
 90.  397 Md. at 227, 916 A.2d 324 (2007).  
 91.  Id. at 227, 916 A.2d at 327. 
 92.  Id. at 228, 916 A.2d at 327–28.  
 93.  Id. at 229, 916 A.2d at 328. 
 94.  Id., 916 A.2d at 328–29. 
 95.  Id. at 230, 916 A.2d at 329. 
 96.  Id. at 231, 916 A.2d at 329. 
 2016]     EMINENT DOMAIN IN BALTIMORE: TEN YEARS AFTER KELO 827 
On March 15, 2006, the circuit court granted the City’s petition, and 
Mr. Valsamaki timely filed an answer challenging the City’s immediate 
need for the Property.97  At the hearing, two witnesses for the City 
explained that upon immediate granting of the title, the City, although not 
currently complete, would have a Request for Proposal (“RFP”) ready 
within a matter of weeks for potential developers.98  The witnesses further 
stated, however, that the City could never predict the results that would 
stem from the RFP.99  The trial court denied the City’s petitions, finding 
that the City had failed to demonstrate sufficient grounds to warrant the 
finding of necessity requisite for the immediate taking.100  The City filed a 
motion for reconsideration to alter or amend judgment, which was 
denied.101  The City then noted a direct appeal to the Court of Appeals.102 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.103  
Under the Code of Public Local Laws of Baltimore City, Md., Section 21-
16(a), the City must sufficiently demonstrate the reason or reasons why it is 
necessary for it to have immediate possession and immediate title to a 
particular property via the exercise of a quick-take condemnation.104  The 
court held that quick-take condemnation is to be used by the City only when 
the public interest demands that it is necessary for property to be 
immediately taken.105  Moreover, the court held that careful scrutiny must 
be employed when evaluating the use of quick-take condemnation 
procedure “to ensure that its use, in the first place, is supported by the 
immediacy.”106  The court frowned on “quick-take” acquisitions for 
“unnamed and unknown developers.”107 
In reviewing the language of the statute, the court reasoned that 
Section 21-16 expressly required the City to state reasons relating to 
immediacy; “thus the City has the burden not only to present a prima facie 
case of public use, but, additionally, in a quick-take action, the burden to 
establish the necessity for an immediate taking.”108  The court, highlighting 
the difference between regular eminent domain proceedings and quick-take 
condemnation, then compared the case with several other quick-take 
                                                          
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. at 236, 916 A.2d at 332.  
 99.  Id.  
 100.  Id. at 238, 916 A.2d at 334. 
 101.  Id. at 239, 916 A.2d at 334.  
 102.  Id.; see BALT. CITY, MD., CODE OF PUBLIC LOCAL LAWS, § 21-16 (c) (providing “an 
immediate right of appeal to the Court of Appeals of Maryland from the decision of the trial 
court”).  
 103.  Id. at 227, 916 A.2d at 356. 
 104.  Id. at 245–46, 916 A.2d at 338. 
 105.  Id. at 246, 916 A.2d at 338. 
 106.  Id. at 261, 916 A.2d at 347. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. at 254, 916 A.2d at 343. 
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cases.109  Like the court in Collington Crossroads, the court in Valsamaki 
considered the City Council’s Charles North Urban Renewal Plan 
Ordinance in its analysis.  However, also like the court in Collington 
Crossroads, the court maintained that the question of immediate necessity is 
a judicial one which could not be determined by the legislature.110 
2.  Sapero v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City 
Sapero v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City111 took Valsamaki 
two steps further, posing similar yet distinct issues: (1) whether the quick-
take statute denies due process where the Appellant was not permitted to 
conduct and complete discovery; and (2) whether Appellee proved an 
immediate need for possession by merely testifying that it was necessary for 
“business expansion.”112 
This case arises out of the same redevelopment plan cited in 
Valsamaki—the Charles North Urban Renewal Plan for the Charles North 
Revitalization Area.113  On December 8, 2005, the City filed an action for 
quick-take condemnation with the circuit court that included a petition for 
immediate possession of and title to the identified properties (the 
“Properties”).114  The petition contained the same language and affidavit as 
the petition in Valsamaki.115  At the “right to take” hearing, the President of 
Baltimore Development Corporation (“BDC”) and the Director of Planning 
and Design/Project Manager for the Charles North area stated that the City 
                                                          
 109.  See, e.g., Free State Realty Co. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 279 Md. 550, 369 A.2d 
1030 (1977) (finding that, based upon an affidavit, the property constituted an immediate serious 
and growing menace to public health, safety, and welfare); Segall v. Mayor & City Council of 
Balt., 273 Md. 647, 648, 331 A.2d 298, 298–99 (1975) (finding affidavit showed that all other 
properties in the development area had been acquired and sale of the entire site could not be 
completed until the subject property had been acquired).  But see Mayor & City Council of 
Baltimore v. Kelso Corp., 281 Md. 514, 518, 380 A.2d 216, 219 (1977) (finding property owner 
never challenged the City’s compliance with the formal requirements of § 21-16 or lack of power 
to condemn, and therefore had no basis to attack the City’s quick-take condemnation action); 
Kelso Corp. v. Mayor and City Council of Balt., 45 Md. App. 120, 129, 411 A.2d 691, 696 (1980) 
(“[The] appellant has failed to show that the City lacked the power or right to condemn its 
property.”).  The Court of Special Appeals held in Kelso that the desire for the general assemblage 
of properties for urban renewal might be sufficient to justify the use of regular condemnation 
proceedings, but absent more specific and compelling evidence, does not satisfy the immediacy 
and necessity requirements under quick-take condemnation.  Kelso Corp., 45 Md. App. at 129, 
411 A.2d at 696.  The affidavit attached to the petition for immediate possession and title only 
provided that immediate possession is necessary “in order to assist in a business expansion in the 
area.”  Id.  This statement, in and of itself, while perhaps sufficient to justify regular 
condemnation, did not justify a quick-take condemnation.  Id.  
 110.  Valsamaki, 397 Md. at 273, 916 A.2d at 354.  
 111.  398 Md. 317, 920 A.2d 1061 (2007). 
 112.  Id. at 321, 920 A.2d at 1063. 
 113.  Id. at 323, 920 A.2d at 1064. 
 114.  Id. at 320, 920 A.2d at 1062. 
 115.  Id. at 327, 920 A.2d at 1066–67. 
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had already received three proposals to redevelop the Properties.116  
Consequently, the circuit court granted the City’s petitions and denied Mr. 
Sapero’s motion to vacate.117  Mr. Sapero filed a motion to alter or amend 
judgment, which the circuit court denied.118  Mr. Sapero subsequently 
appealed directly to the Court of Appeals.119  In reversing the circuit court, 
the Court of Appeals maintained that (1):  
Whenever immediate possession is sought, given the minimal 
time frame envisioned for proceeding under [Baltimore, 
Maryland, Code of Local Public Laws, Section] 21-16, discovery 
appropriate to the case should occur, even if the normal discovery 
time frames are shortened by order of the court based on a party’s 
motion . . . .”120  
The court continued, and (2): 
 In the case of regular condemnation, once the City establishes 
at least a minimal level of public use or purpose, judicial review 
may be thereafter limited to determining that the agency’s 
decision is not so oppressive, arbitrary or unreasonable as to 
suggest bad faith; that, however, is not the case in assessing 
immediacy in a quick-take condemnation action [pursuant to 
Baltimore, Maryland, Code of Local Public Laws, Section] 21-
16.  Rather, the court must also determine whether there is a 
necessity to justify an immediate taking and, in that 
determination, must be able to assess the reasons for the 
immediacy.  [Code of Local Public Laws of Baltimore City,] 
Section 21-16 expressly requires the City to state reasons relating 
to immediacy, thus the City has the burden not only to present a 
prima facie case of public use, but, additionally, in a quick-take 
action, the burden to establish the necessity for an immediate 
taking.121 
The court reasoned that “[q]uick-take condemnation results in a 
deprivation of the constitutionally protected right to property without the 
more complete due process protections available in a regular condemnation 
action.”122  The City cited Johnson v. Consolidated Gas, Electric Light & 
Power Co.123 in arguing that the taking only had to be “reasonable under the 
                                                          
 116.  Id. at 330–33, 920 A.2d at 1069–70. 
 117.  Id. at 330, 920 A.2d at 1068. 
 118.  Id. at 333, 920 A.2d at 1070. 
 119.  Id.  
 120.  Id. at 347, 920 A.2d at 1079. 
 121.  Id. at 335, 920 A.2d at 1071 (quoting Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Valsamaki, 397 
Md. 222, 254, 916 A.2d 324, 343 (2007)). 
 122.  Id. at 338, 920 A.2d at 1073. 
 123.  187 Md. 454, 50 A.2d 918 (1947). 
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circumstances.”124  However, the court distinguished Johnson, noting that 
that case did not involve a quick-take condemnation under Section 21-16.125  
The Sapero court also distinguished Free State Realty Co., noting that there 
was no evidence presented that quick-take was necessary for the public’s 
health, safety, or immediate welfare, nor was it asserted by admitted 
evidence that Mr. Sapero was a “hold-out” of any sort.126 
The court further noted that the City in both Sapero and Valsamaki 
never bothered to respond to discovery requests.127  The Court of Appeals 
emphasized that no extreme circumstances existed that warranted 
abridgement of procedural due process protections available in regular 
condemnation proceedings.128  Moreover, the City had to respond to 
discovery requests in quick-take condemnation cases.129  The lack of 
response to discovery request placed the defendant property owners at a 
distinct disadvantage when challenging the City’s right to take the property.  
The property owners were unable to counter the City’s arguments and fully 
litigate the issues upon which the City’s witnesses testified at the hearing 
and were not able to sufficiently prepare.130 
3.  A&E North, LLC v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore 
A&E North, LLC v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore131 focused on 
the relocation concerns of a property owner.  The owner, A&E North, LLC 
(“A&E”) wanted the City to pay relocation expense prior to the trial for 
valuation of the property.132  Thus, the Court of Appeals was requested to 
consider whether “a condemnee [is] entitled to a payment of relocation 
expenses in advance of the trial, when the condemnee challenges the 
condemning agency’s authority to condemn.”133 
On October 9, 2008, the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore filed a 
Petition for Condemnation (regular condemnation) in the Circuit Court for 
Baltimore City, seeking to condemn A&E’s theater “‘for the public purpose 
of urban renewal, pursuant to the Charles/North Revitalization Area Urban 
Renewal Plan.’”134  Six weeks before trial, A&E filed an Emergency 
Motion to compel the immediate payment by the City of relocation 
expenses, which would allow A&E to move its personal property from the 
                                                          
 124.  Sapero, 398 Md. at 339, 920 A.2d at 1074. 
 125.  Id. at 340, 920 A.2d at 1074. 
 126.  Id. at 341–42, 920 A.2d at 1075–76.   
 127.  Id. at 347, 920 A.2d at 1078. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. at 339.   
 131.  431 Md. 253, 64 A.3d 903 (2013). 
 132.  Id. at 255, 64 A.3d at 905. 
 133.  Id. at 259–60, 64 A.3d at 907. 
 134.  Id. at 256, 64 A.3d at 905. 
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Parkway Theater prior to trial.135  A&E argued that “‘the presence of the 
Personal Property obstruct[ed] the views of the magnificent interior and 
[would] cause the jury to discount its value, thereby severely prejudicing 
[its] case in the eyes of the jury.’”136  The circuit court denied both A&E’s 
motion for payment and its request for postponement of the trial.137 At the 
beginning of the trial, A&E again requested a continuance, citing its lack of 
appraisals, the owner’s health, and the continued presence of junk in the 
theater, but the court denied the motion.138  The jury returned a verdict 
based upon the City’s fair market value of $340,000.139  Based upon that 
judgment, the circuit court entered an inquisition transferring the Property 
to the Mayor and City Council.140  A&E then petitioned the Court of 
Appeals, which granted both A&E’s petition for a writ of certiorari and the 
City’s cross-petition.141 
The Maryland Court of Appeals concluded that, at the time A&E filed 
the Emergency Motion, it was not a “displaced person.”142  Under the 
Maryland Real Property Code:  
[P]ersons who move themselves or move personal property ‘[a]s 
a direct result of a written notice of intent to acquire or the 
acquisition of . . . real property in whole or in part by a displacing 
agency,’ are considered ‘displaced persons’ and may be entitled 
to a payment of their relocation expenses.143 
The Maryland Real Property Code continues, stating: 
The purpose of the relocation statutes is to assist with relocation 
by providing for (1) reimbursement of actual relocation and 
moving expenses and (2) payment of relocation expenses in 
advance of the move in hardship cases.  While the purpose of a 
payment in advance of a move is to facilitate the move, a 
payment in advance of trial is “to enhance the Property’s visual 
appeal to a jury.144 
According to the court, the latter is not a goal contemplated by the 
Relocation Act.145  The court dismissed A&E’s argument that the entity was 
entitled to an advance relocation payment prior to trial because the owner 
                                                          
 135.  Id. at 257, 64 A.3d at 906. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. at 257, 64 A.3d at 906. 
 138.  Id. at 257–58, 64 A.3d at 906. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. at 270, 64 A.3d at 914. 
 143.  Id. at 264, 64 A.3d at 910 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 12-201(e) (1), 205, 
210(c) (2) (West 2015)). 
 144.  Id. at 267, 64 A.3d at 912. 
 145.  Id. 
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was indigent.146  The court found that A&E tied the claim of entitlement to 
an advance payment to the trial, as opposed to the move.147  The court 
further reasoned that the argument overlooked the circumstances of the 
case, namely, that at the time A&E requested an advance payment, it was 
contesting the City’s right to condemn the theater.148  Furthermore, 
although the argument focused on A&E’s alleged hardship, as in any other 
relocation assistance case, the primary consideration before the court was 
whether A&E was a “displaced person” at the time it requested 
assistance.149  The court concluded that A&E was not.150 
4.  Makowski v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore 
Makowski v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore151 involved the issue 
of a “hold out” in a development project.152  “[B]eginning in the 1950s, 
Baltimore City, and particularly, the East Baltimore neighborhood, began 
losing manufacturing jobs.  The City continued to hemorrhage jobs through 
the 1990s, causing significant urban decay marked by high crime, high 
unemployment, population loss, and a general deterioration in the Middle 
East neighborhood.”153 
After a sequence of failed piecemeal redevelopment strategies, 
[t]he City, then, turned to more comprehensive redevelopment 
and revitalization efforts, including a “non-profit partnership 
between government, philanthropists, institutions, and the 
community” to undertake a massive revitalization of property in 
the East Baltimore community, called the East Baltimore 
Development Initiative (“EBDI”).  EBDI was intended to 
“address, for the first time, on a comprehensive basis the blight 
and disinvestment in the neighborhood” through the 
redevelopment of an area encompassing 88 acres in proximity to 
the Johns Hopkins University Medical Campus; specifically, it 
would involve the construction of “biotechnology, research, and 
life sciences buildings, a new community school . . . senior 
housing . . . mixed income residential homes and rental units, 
commercial and retail property, green/open spaces, a new park, 
and fresh food stores.”  To acquire the properties necessary for 
the EBDI project, the City was authorized, pursuant to the 
                                                          
 146.  Id. at 265–66, 64 A.3d at 911. 
 147.  Id. at 266, 64 A.3d at 911. 
 148.  Id. at 268, 64 A.3d at 912. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. at 270, 64 A.3d at 914. 
 151.  439 Md. 169, 94 A.3d 91 (2014). 
 152.  Id. at 185, 94 A.3d at 101. 
 153.  Id. at 173, 94 A.3d at 94. 
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Baltimore City Ordinance No. 11-453 entitled the “Middle East 
Urban Renewal Plan”, to acquire, via voluntary conveyance, 
purchase or condemnation, properties in the project area.”154 
The property located at 900–902 N. Chester Street, Baltimore, 
Maryland (the “Property”) was situated in the designated urban renewal 
area.155  Before filing a condemnation proceeding, the City negotiated a 
rental agreement and a right of entry to the Property.  As negotiations 
regarding the fair market value of the Property failed, in April of 2012, the 
City filed a Petition for Condemnation (regular condemnation) in the circuit 
court pursuant to Baltimore City Ordinance Nos. 1202 and 11-453.156 
Prior to trial, the City filed a Petition for Immediate Possession and 
Title pursuant to Section 21-16 of the Code of Public Local Laws of 
Baltimore City and deposited into the Court Registry the fair market value 
of the Property.157  An affidavit included in the petition indicated that 
immediate possession of the Property was necessary and that the City had 
effectively acquired title to all other properties on Block 1587, where the 
Property was located.158 
The circuit court held a hearing on the City’s right to take the Property 
in which the Director of Property Acquisition and Relocation, Department 
of Housing and Community Development, was the City’s only witness.159  
He testified, 
consistent with his affidavit, that the City had an immediate need 
for the [Subject] Property, because the structures on Block 1587 
had to be demolished prior to the opening of the school in August 
“to mitigate the possible effects of dust and other elements that 
would result from having to do the demolition if the school were, 
in fact, in session.”  He also testified that there were only two 
properties that had not yet been acquired on Block 1587 within 
two weeks of the hearing—the [Subject] Property and a 
church, . . . which the City had acquired in the intervening period 
of time between filing of the quick-take petition and the hearing 
date.160 
The Circuit Court for Baltimore City concluded that Mr. Makowski 
was in fact a “hold-out” and, as a result, granted the City’s quick-take 
Petition.161  Mr. Makowski filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was 
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 156.  Id. at 177, 94 A.3d at 96. 
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denied.162  Thereafter, Mr. Makowski appealed directly to the Court of 
Appeals.163 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, 
emphasizing “that to prevail in a quick-take condemnation, the City must 
prove that the property is being condemned for a public use and that it has 
an immediate need to acquire the property.”164  “[T]he City must provide 
specific evidence of an immediate need, not merely a bald assertion that one 
exists.”165  Pursuant to Section 21-16 of the Code of Public Local Laws of 
Baltimore City, the City may condemn property via “quick-take” 
proceedings to address a “hold-out” situation.166 
 A “hold-out” occurs in projects involving property 
assemblages, i.e., when multiple properties are assembled for a 
single project, where “one or more property owners resist selling, 
wanting to be the last owner of a parcel or among the last, in 
order to be able to demand higher prices for their property 
because they are holding up a large project.167 
Furthermore, the court held that neither Valsamaki nor Sapero required 
“that the City bear a burden higher than what is traditionally required in 
civil cases—a preponderance of the evidence.”168  The Court of Appeals 
agreed with the circuit court’s analysis distinguishing this case from 
Valsamaki and found it analogous to Segall v. Mayor & City Council of 
Baltimore169 because the property owner appeared to be taking part in a 
hold-out scenario.170 
The question of whether the use of eminent domain for purpose of 
economic development is constitutional remains a moot point.  The two 
justifications for the immediate taking of a property remain the same as in 
Valsamaki: (1) if the property is a hold-out; or, (2) if the property poses a 
significant risk to public health.171  The court in Makowski, however, did 
not reach the merits of the argument that delaying the acquisition of the 
property could pose a health risk to students once school began.172 
                                                          
 162.  Id. at 186–87, 94 A.3d at 102. 
 163.  Id. at 187, 94 A.3d at 102.  Mr. Makowski initially appealed to the Court of Special 
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IV.  PRACTICE POINTERS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Baltimore, like most major urban centers, continues to struggle in the 
face of intractable poverty, absentee landlords, civil unrest, crime, and an 
assorted range of social problems.173  In Baltimore City, both the State of 
Maryland and City of Baltimore governments have used eminent domain to 
stimulate private investment for economic development.174 
There are lessons, practice pointers, and policy considerations to be 
gleaned from the foregoing cases and experience in Baltimore City.175  
Basic constitutional standards require that no property be taken without just 
compensation, that the property is used for a “public purpose,” and that the 
property owner receives a fair process, which requires notice and an 
opportunity to be heard.176  Even the most supportive judiciary requires a 
legislative process providing authority, a well thought-out plan, and a clear 
process when subdivisions seek to acquire property through eminent 
domain.  During the past decade, a number of issues (i.e., use of regular 
condemnation versus quick-take, the basis for condemnation, right to take, 
and fair market value) have been confronted in the defense of condemnation 
cases for the City of Baltimore.177  The following is advice offered to 
overcome the charges of eminent domain abuse, and to facilitate the 
government’s redevelopment of blighted and/or undeveloped areas: 
1.  Keep legislative authorization updated and current.  Most codes 
have provisions for emergency situations; however, sunset determinations 
negate ad infinitum authority for legislative authorization.  The Maryland 
legislature has recognized the need to decrease the amount of time that 
                                                          
 173.  The Baltimore City Police Department documents crime statistics.  See generally OPEN 
BALTIMORE, https://data.baltimorecity.gov (last visited Jan. 28, 2016).   See also, CENSUS 2010, 
http://census.maryland.gov/census2010/pl-total (last visited Feb. 2, 2016).  The Census documents 
population decline, vacant housing, and disinvestment, among issues.   
 174.  Oriole Park at Camden Yards and M&T Bank stadium, home to the Ravens franchise, are 
prime examples of state projects that were developed with the assistance of eminent domain.  
These venues have spurred a range of residential and commercial development to support the 
athletic events they hold.  See Maryland Stadium Authority, MARYLAND MANUAL ON-LINE: A 
GUIDE TO MARYLAND & ITS GOVERNMENT 
http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/25ind/html/66stadf.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2016).  The 
state-funded Hippodrome Theatre project in 2004, which revitalized the 2300-seat theatre built in 
1914, is another project that set in motion the vitalization of the City’s West Side community (that 
is, the west side of the former central business district).  Eminent domain was used on the West 
Side Community Project to stimulate a comprehensive approach.  While the redevelopment has 
lagged during the economic downturn since 2008, development continues.   
 175.  Andrew G. Bailey & Elva E. Tillman, Practice Pointers and Policy Considerations for the 
Responsible Use of Eminent Domain Post-Kelo (September 10-14, 2014) (paper presented at the 
International Municipal Lawyers Association (“IMLA”), 2014 Annual Conference, Baltimore, 
Maryland) (on file with author and included in the Municipal Lawyers Magazine, Sept.—Oct., 
2014, available to IMLA members ).   
 176.  U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.  
 177.  See generally cases cited in supra Section III.B.   
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governmental entities have to bring condemnation actions.178  Legislative 
authorizations typically include notice and opportunity to be heard.  In 
Baltimore, such authorization has taken the form of urban renewal plans.179  
Citizen participation in these plans is very high.  The planning commission 
and the city council hearings afford opportunities for the affected 
population to review plans and to be heard.  These opportunities to be heard 
are available for not only people living in the area, but also for those who 
work and own property in the area.180 
2.  Acquire property pursuant to a well-reasoned plan that is supported 
by a legitimate legislative process.  Property should not be acquired to be 
stockpiled.181  All of the Maryland cases discussed in this Essay indicate 
that a well-reasoned plan is preferred.  The use of eminent domain is a 
serious threat to individual property rights.  That use should be tempered by 
the development of a plan that provides significant impact for public use 
and/or benefit. 
3.  Support public purpose through public benefit, if not public use.  If 
we use eminent domain for economic development it is clear that not all 
projects will be for the use of the public “at large.”  However, we can be 
certain that each project is grounded in public benefit, that is, it is not a 
project so narrowly drawn that a minimal number of people will benefit 
from it. 
4.  Provide relocation to assist in making the property owner whole.  
The federal and state governments define a “displaced person” as one who 
moves as a result of the acquisition of a property for public use.182  A 
displaced person can include any individual, family, partnership, 
corporation or association.  The aim is to formulate and follow a uniform 
policy for the fair and equitable treatment of displaced persons.183 
5.  Mediate the valuation of the property.  Experience has indicated 
that condemnation cases are complex matters, involving the right to take 
and valuation.  It is always better to have the parties decide the valuation in 
a collaborative manner instead of a disinterested person (i.e., a judge or 
                                                          
 178.  Maryland Annotated Code, Real Property Article § 12-105.1 was added to the annotated 
code.  Prior to this amendment the State and its local subdivisions had an unfettered ability to take 
property at any time.  Section 12-105.1 initially reflected a three year time limit for taking 
property  but was amended to afford the State and its subdivisions four years to file a petition for 
condemnation.  
 179.  See BALT., MD, BALT. CITY CODE art. 13, § 2-6 (2015).   
 180. The hearing requirements are laid out for Urban Renewal Plans in BALTIMORE CITY 
CODE art. 13, § 2-6(d). 
 181.  See Mayor & City Council of Balt. City v. Valsamaki, 397 Md. 222, 261, 916 A.2d 324, 
347 (2007). 
 182.  See, e.g., Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 
1970, Pub. L. No.91-646, 84 Stat. 1894 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601–4655 (2012); see also A & 
E North, LLC v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 431 Md. 253, 64 A.3d 903 (2013). 
 183.  Id. 
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jury).  In a condemnation case, it can take a year to finally get to trial.  A 
final verdict can result in appeals which can lengthen an already long 
process.  Mediation affords a final resolution and an opportunity to 
conclude the case. 
 
